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A possible downgrade of 1-A Platonic concepts (Staff only)
- Thread starter Crossedline17
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Yes. My country might collapse completely soon, which would obviously strongly risk to destroy my life as well, so I obviously understand. I am just trying to calm people here down in general, so we don't take out our stress on each other.Sera EX said:
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I think Concept Manip types 1 and 2 should be changed as I outlined above, but I'm not exactly sure how the explanations for them would be written. I'd appreciate help from Ultima/Assalt/DontTalk/anyone else capable of writing those sorts of explanations.
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The Tiering System thread was quite some time ago and I don't quite remember what I meant back then anymore. So excuse me if my proposal is somewhat different to what was agreed to back then. Here's a suggestion:
Notice that I on purpose use the word outside not superior/transcendent for Type 1. We could also use superior, but then Type 1 would probably not apply to anything.
- Type 1: Concepts which exist outside of spacetime on any level and for which the reality they apply to merely "participates" in them. For example, a circular object is circular because it is "participating" in the concept of "circle-ness". In this way, the alteration of these concepts will change every object participating in the concept across all of reality. These concepts must exist prior to and after the existence of any object of the concept.
- Type 2: Concepts which exist on the abstract plane of a certain region or dimension of space and for which the reality they apply to merely "participates" in them. The difference between these and Type 1 concepts is that they belong to a certain region or dimension of space and only exist within this region. A concept which only applies in a certain pocket dimension and vanishes together with it is an example for this type. Unless concepts are known to exist independently of at least infinite dimensional space, they are usually assumed to be of this type, having the extend of the space they are known to apply to.
Notice that I on purpose use the word outside not superior/transcendent for Type 1. We could also use superior, but then Type 1 would probably not apply to anything.
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Been sick for most of the day, so apologies if I'm late to this, or if I didn't make my points clear enough.
Anyways, that looks alright to me, although I have some doubts on what exactly Type 2 concepts being "local" in comparision to Type 1 concepts entails here. For instance:
Concepts which exist on the abstract plane of a certain region or dimension of space and for which the reality they apply to merely "participates" in them.
The difference between these and Type 1 concepts is that they belong to a certain region or dimension of space and only exist within this region. A concept which only applies in a certain pocket dimension and vanishes together with it is an example for this type.
This implies that the "locality" of Type 2 Concepts is defined strictly from the perspective of the verse they belong to, as seen with the example of concepts that only apply to a single pocket dimension and the like; they would be basically "regional" concepts, by this definition. Now, we then have these paragraphs:
Concepts which exist outside of spacetime on any level and for which the reality they apply to merely "participates" in them.
Unless concepts are known to exist independently of at least infinite dimensional space, they are usually assumed to be of this type, having the extend of the space they are known to apply to.
This implies that the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 concepts is that the former define and exist external to any and all extensions of their particulars, regardless if they physically exist in their setting or not, while the latter only define the extensions which have been explicitly shown to exist in the verse they're in (i.e Type 1 concepts are 1-A while Type 2 concepts are variable).
In this sense, Type 2 concepts would be "local" from the perspective of the Tiering System itself; they wouldn't necessarily encompass everything from Low 1-C to Low 1-A as Type 1 concepts do, but could still encompass everything in their verse nonetheless.
So, which is it, exactly? And to extend the last point a bit: In principle, couldn't you have Type 1 concepts that only apply to a certain region of reality (a pocket dimension, for instance), and Type 2 concepts that apply to the entirety of a verse's setting as well? (Note that these examples are separate, not set in the same cosmology.)
Anyways, that looks alright to me, although I have some doubts on what exactly Type 2 concepts being "local" in comparision to Type 1 concepts entails here. For instance:
Concepts which exist on the abstract plane of a certain region or dimension of space and for which the reality they apply to merely "participates" in them.
The difference between these and Type 1 concepts is that they belong to a certain region or dimension of space and only exist within this region. A concept which only applies in a certain pocket dimension and vanishes together with it is an example for this type.
This implies that the "locality" of Type 2 Concepts is defined strictly from the perspective of the verse they belong to, as seen with the example of concepts that only apply to a single pocket dimension and the like; they would be basically "regional" concepts, by this definition. Now, we then have these paragraphs:
Concepts which exist outside of spacetime on any level and for which the reality they apply to merely "participates" in them.
Unless concepts are known to exist independently of at least infinite dimensional space, they are usually assumed to be of this type, having the extend of the space they are known to apply to.
This implies that the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 concepts is that the former define and exist external to any and all extensions of their particulars, regardless if they physically exist in their setting or not, while the latter only define the extensions which have been explicitly shown to exist in the verse they're in (i.e Type 1 concepts are 1-A while Type 2 concepts are variable).
In this sense, Type 2 concepts would be "local" from the perspective of the Tiering System itself; they wouldn't necessarily encompass everything from Low 1-C to Low 1-A as Type 1 concepts do, but could still encompass everything in their verse nonetheless.
So, which is it, exactly? And to extend the last point a bit: In principle, couldn't you have Type 1 concepts that only apply to a certain region of reality (a pocket dimension, for instance), and Type 2 concepts that apply to the entirety of a verse's setting as well? (Note that these examples are separate, not set in the same cosmology.)
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(i.e Type 1 Concepts are 1-A while Type 2 Concepts are variable)
Not really. Type 1 concepts, as far as I can tell under this new definition, would typically start at High 1-B, but could exist earlier with sufficient backing and context. And simply being a concept and 1-A wouldn't be enough for type 1, it would still need statements of applying to all scales.
So, which is it, exactly? And to extend the last point a bit: In principle, couldn't you have Type 1 concepts that only apply to a certain region of reality (a pocket dimension, for instance), and Type 2 concepts that apply to the entirety of a verse's setting as well? (Note that these examples are separate, not set in the same cosmology.)
For the first one, no, because type 1 concepts have to apply to all regions regardless of scale.
For the second one, sure, vaguely described concepts would end up there, even if they apply to the entirety of a verse's setting.
As far as I can tell, this revision would lock a lot of concepts out of being type 1, and that seems fair enough to me.
Not really. Type 1 concepts, as far as I can tell under this new definition, would typically start at High 1-B, but could exist earlier with sufficient backing and context. And simply being a concept and 1-A wouldn't be enough for type 1, it would still need statements of applying to all scales.
So, which is it, exactly? And to extend the last point a bit: In principle, couldn't you have Type 1 concepts that only apply to a certain region of reality (a pocket dimension, for instance), and Type 2 concepts that apply to the entirety of a verse's setting as well? (Note that these examples are separate, not set in the same cosmology.)
For the first one, no, because type 1 concepts have to apply to all regions regardless of scale.
For the second one, sure, vaguely described concepts would end up there, even if they apply to the entirety of a verse's setting.
As far as I can tell, this revision would lock a lot of concepts out of being type 1, and that seems fair enough to me.
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Ultima Reality said:
I would not use the "apply" terminology. If we defined concepts as applying to all scales that would make Concepts Tier 0+. Nothing would really have that.Agnaa said:
My proposal (which is by all means open for debate as I'm not confident about it) would be that a Type 1 Concept is one outside of spacetime in general, but not necessarily applying to it on every level (by that not requiring the Tier 0+ proofs). Standard of evidence would be explanations that the concepts are outside (i.e. unbound) of space in general and more specific proof for at least infinite dimensions.
As Agnaa said this would usually start at High 1-B concepts, with possible exceptions.
It's essentially two levels of abstractness. Type 2 is abstract to the material world, but not to location/plane of existence, while Type 1 is abstract to even such things.
I would say yes, even if probably rare. Requirement would be that the concept is clearly not associated / bound to the region of reality, but only limited to it in application area.Ultima Reality said:
So, for example, there could be a verse that has a specific concept outside/unbound by space on any level, with evidence of that being on an at least infinite dimensional scale, which only applies to one universe. That could for example be because it is "The Concept of Universe 17th gravity", which only applies to Universe 17.
Type 2 concepts that apply to the entirety of a verse's setting as well?
Could be the case, if the concepts don't have the evidence needed to be independent of location.
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Sorry to necro this or add my comment as I'm not a staff member. But I've been waiting for a community conversation about how conceptual manipulation is treated, for a very long time.
I personally believe that the problems that arrive from the concept manipulation page, is because we use Platonic concepts.
I don't think we should be using Platonism as a basis for conceptual manipulation because Platonism runs into some logic problems and contradictions.
Platonic concepts are defined as:
" Such concepts, or forms, are completely transcendent of reality in every aspect. These forms are 1-A in nature, as they are beyond all spatial and temporal dimensional constructs and all of reality merely "participate" in these concepts. For example, a circular object is circular because it is "participating" in the form of "circle-ness". In this way, the alteration of these concepts will change every object of the concept across all of reality. These concepts must exist prior to and after the existence of any object of the concept."
If we believe this to be true, then I ask you this question: How many platonic concepts are there?
Be warned that this is a trick question and the answer to this question doesn't matter. Whether there are infinite concepts or a finite number of concepts, for there to exist more than one concept, then the concept of plurality must be applied to all concepts. And all concepts are participating in the concept of plurality. And because they are participating in the concept of plurality, then they can't be true platonic concepts. As platonic concepts must be pure, and independent.
Now, a way to address this concern is to say that within our definition, there is nothing to say that a platonic concept can't participate in another platonic concept. If that is true, then I bring you another question:
If platonic concepts can participate with other platonic concepts, then do certain platonic concepts exist before others, or do they exist at the same time? For example, the concept of red vs. the concept of color. The concept of red participates in the concept of color, but does the concept of color predate the concept of red?
If some platonic concepts exist before other platonic concepts, then platonic concepts do not exist outside time (because for there to be a before, then then there is a sequence of events, therefore time) and then they aren't platonic concepts.
To solve this problem then you can argue that all platonic concepts exist at the same time. Which means that the concept of red participates in the concept color, but both concepts exist at the same time and neither predated either.
If this is true, then it opens another problem: If platonic concepts are separate and independent of reality, can be dependent on each other, and all existed at the same and no concept predated any other concept, then every single concept that could ever exist must already exist. It would be impossible to create anything that doesn't already have a form to participate in. So to create something truly new, then one must create a new form. But that is a contradiction.
It is impossible to create a new platonic form because all platonic forms cannot pre-date other forms. Once platonic forms existed, there can't be any more.
TL;DR
To summarize, the problem with Platonic Concepts is that concepts participate in other concepts. While Platonic Concepts are supposed to be pure and independent.
Possible Solution: Platonic Concepts must be pure and independent from reality but can be dependent and participate in other concepts.
New Problem: if Platonic concepts can be independent and participate in other concepts, then do some concepts predate other concepts? If they do then they aren't transcendent of time.
Possible Solution: Platonic concepts can be independent and participate in other concepts, but no concept predates other concepts, and they all exist at once.
New Problem: if Platonic concepts can be independent and participate in other concept, and none predates any, then it is impossible to create any new concept because no concept can be predated by other concepts.
I personally believe that the problems that arrive from the concept manipulation page, is because we use Platonic concepts.
I don't think we should be using Platonism as a basis for conceptual manipulation because Platonism runs into some logic problems and contradictions.
Platonic concepts are defined as:
" Such concepts, or forms, are completely transcendent of reality in every aspect. These forms are 1-A in nature, as they are beyond all spatial and temporal dimensional constructs and all of reality merely "participate" in these concepts. For example, a circular object is circular because it is "participating" in the form of "circle-ness". In this way, the alteration of these concepts will change every object of the concept across all of reality. These concepts must exist prior to and after the existence of any object of the concept."
If we believe this to be true, then I ask you this question: How many platonic concepts are there?
Be warned that this is a trick question and the answer to this question doesn't matter. Whether there are infinite concepts or a finite number of concepts, for there to exist more than one concept, then the concept of plurality must be applied to all concepts. And all concepts are participating in the concept of plurality. And because they are participating in the concept of plurality, then they can't be true platonic concepts. As platonic concepts must be pure, and independent.
Now, a way to address this concern is to say that within our definition, there is nothing to say that a platonic concept can't participate in another platonic concept. If that is true, then I bring you another question:
If platonic concepts can participate with other platonic concepts, then do certain platonic concepts exist before others, or do they exist at the same time? For example, the concept of red vs. the concept of color. The concept of red participates in the concept of color, but does the concept of color predate the concept of red?
If some platonic concepts exist before other platonic concepts, then platonic concepts do not exist outside time (because for there to be a before, then then there is a sequence of events, therefore time) and then they aren't platonic concepts.
To solve this problem then you can argue that all platonic concepts exist at the same time. Which means that the concept of red participates in the concept color, but both concepts exist at the same time and neither predated either.
If this is true, then it opens another problem: If platonic concepts are separate and independent of reality, can be dependent on each other, and all existed at the same and no concept predated any other concept, then every single concept that could ever exist must already exist. It would be impossible to create anything that doesn't already have a form to participate in. So to create something truly new, then one must create a new form. But that is a contradiction.
It is impossible to create a new platonic form because all platonic forms cannot pre-date other forms. Once platonic forms existed, there can't be any more.
TL;DR
To summarize, the problem with Platonic Concepts is that concepts participate in other concepts. While Platonic Concepts are supposed to be pure and independent.
Possible Solution: Platonic Concepts must be pure and independent from reality but can be dependent and participate in other concepts.
New Problem: if Platonic concepts can be independent and participate in other concepts, then do some concepts predate other concepts? If they do then they aren't transcendent of time.
Possible Solution: Platonic concepts can be independent and participate in other concepts, but no concept predates other concepts, and they all exist at once.
New Problem: if Platonic concepts can be independent and participate in other concept, and none predates any, then it is impossible to create any new concept because no concept can be predated by other concepts.
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And all concepts are participating in the concept of plurality. And because they are participating in the concept of plurality, then they can't be true platonic concepts. As platonic concepts must be pure, and independent.
From what I know, it isn't true that platonic concepts must be pure and independent. Even Plato himself discussed the "form of forms", so even he mentioned Platonic concepts participating in other Platonic concepts.
If this is true, then it opens another problem: If platonic concepts are separate and independent of reality, can be dependent on each other, and all existed at the same and no concept predated any other concept, then every single concept that could ever exist must already exist. It would be impossible to create anything that doesn't already have a form to participate in. So to create something truly new, then one must create a new form. But that is a contradiction.
Strictly speaking, yeah this would be true. I don't think philosophers who agree with the idea of Platonic concepts ever thought of them as being created anew, I've always heard them described as eternal and external to our reality. Hence why new mathematical curiosities weren't thought to be "created" by people, but the Platonic truth "discovered".
I would say that fiction does break stuff like this, but fiction breaks a lot of things that rely on relatively simple logic like this all the time, so I'm not too fussed about that.
tl;dr I think all your "problems" are actually misunderstandings of how Platonic concepts work.
From what I know, it isn't true that platonic concepts must be pure and independent. Even Plato himself discussed the "form of forms", so even he mentioned Platonic concepts participating in other Platonic concepts.
If this is true, then it opens another problem: If platonic concepts are separate and independent of reality, can be dependent on each other, and all existed at the same and no concept predated any other concept, then every single concept that could ever exist must already exist. It would be impossible to create anything that doesn't already have a form to participate in. So to create something truly new, then one must create a new form. But that is a contradiction.
Strictly speaking, yeah this would be true. I don't think philosophers who agree with the idea of Platonic concepts ever thought of them as being created anew, I've always heard them described as eternal and external to our reality. Hence why new mathematical curiosities weren't thought to be "created" by people, but the Platonic truth "discovered".
I would say that fiction does break stuff like this, but fiction breaks a lot of things that rely on relatively simple logic like this all the time, so I'm not too fussed about that.
tl;dr I think all your "problems" are actually misunderstandings of how Platonic concepts work.
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But I'd like to warn you and others that since these posts were made after the forum backup started, they likely won't be copied to the new forum, so this discussion should probably stop or be taken to a message wall.
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in that case, I'll just wait to after the change to bring this back up and will just save the comments somewhere.
But i will say that while fiction does break stuff, that argument is for when fiction breaks scientific truths, and platonic forms is not a scientific truth.
But i will say that while fiction does break stuff, that argument is for when fiction breaks scientific truths, and platonic forms is not a scientific truth.
Udlmaster
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>But i will say that while fiction does break stuff, that argument is for when fiction breaks scientific truths, and platonic forms is not a scientific truth.
Okay, this is conceptual manipulation, nothing about it is EVER going to be scientific because the basis for it has no basis in science on any level.
As for the rest, all Forms come from 1 singular one, the Form of Good which Plato believed was where all Forms come from and was basically God.
Okay, this is conceptual manipulation, nothing about it is EVER going to be scientific because the basis for it has no basis in science on any level.
As for the rest, all Forms come from 1 singular one, the Form of Good which Plato believed was where all Forms come from and was basically God.
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>Okay, this is conceptual manipulation, nothing about it is EVER going to be scientific because the basis for it has no basis in science on any level.
I agree. But I'm just saying, we can ignore contradictions with platoncism because it's fiction, doesn't work as good argument. Why use the system if we must ignore aspects for it to work?
>As for the rest, all Forms come from 1 singular one, the Form of Good which Plato believed was where all Forms come from and was basically God.
That aspect isn't in our description and not a requirement for Type 1s. And it seems like a vital part of the theory.
I agree. But I'm just saying, we can ignore contradictions with platoncism because it's fiction, doesn't work as good argument. Why use the system if we must ignore aspects for it to work?
>As for the rest, all Forms come from 1 singular one, the Form of Good which Plato believed was where all Forms come from and was basically God.
That aspect isn't in our description and not a requirement for Type 1s. And it seems like a vital part of the theory.
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I am not an Admin but I have a high understanding about this.
- Simply stating one is beyond all Concepts/Reality can mean various things; is simply to vague for them to easily touch 1-A in which case I agree (with it not being instant 1-A) - Hence an explicit reasoning would be needed to justify it.
For a character to be even BASELINE 1-A - Characters who are simply beyond the concept of Space and Time along with Dimensions. That is simply it. Transcendence over this would be levels above this like for example one being quite above the Concept of Space and Time along with Dimensions (can be other things like binary opposition, etc).
As we see on the conceptual manipulation page - Type 1 means - Such concepts, or forms, are completely transcendent of reality in EVERY ASPECT. These forms are 1-A in nature, as they are beyond all spatial and temporal dimensional constructs and ALL OF REALITY MERELY "participate" IN THESE CONCEPTS. Type 1 in simple terms means all reality participates in these types of concepts that are quite beyond Reality. Where as we know reality means the world or the state of things as they actually exist, as opposed to an idealistic or notional idea of them. And these concepts are beyond this in every way.
Any lower form, I would say is not qualifying for 1-A (would be probably at best 1-B) like type 2 as it only is MOSTLY TRANSCENDED over reality Not quite beyond
A character beyond reality/all concepts can mean anything pertaining to it like the universe, you know the standard 3 dimensions etc, and the person is beyond the concepts/reality of the universe.
I know I can write more but this is what I have for now (I may come back later and add on though but I hope I had helped)
- Simply stating one is beyond all Concepts/Reality can mean various things; is simply to vague for them to easily touch 1-A in which case I agree (with it not being instant 1-A) - Hence an explicit reasoning would be needed to justify it.
For a character to be even BASELINE 1-A - Characters who are simply beyond the concept of Space and Time along with Dimensions. That is simply it. Transcendence over this would be levels above this like for example one being quite above the Concept of Space and Time along with Dimensions (can be other things like binary opposition, etc).
As we see on the conceptual manipulation page - Type 1 means - Such concepts, or forms, are completely transcendent of reality in EVERY ASPECT. These forms are 1-A in nature, as they are beyond all spatial and temporal dimensional constructs and ALL OF REALITY MERELY "participate" IN THESE CONCEPTS. Type 1 in simple terms means all reality participates in these types of concepts that are quite beyond Reality. Where as we know reality means the world or the state of things as they actually exist, as opposed to an idealistic or notional idea of them. And these concepts are beyond this in every way.
Any lower form, I would say is not qualifying for 1-A (would be probably at best 1-B) like type 2 as it only is MOSTLY TRANSCENDED over reality Not quite beyond
A character beyond reality/all concepts can mean anything pertaining to it like the universe, you know the standard 3 dimensions etc, and the person is beyond the concepts/reality of the universe.
I know I can write more but this is what I have for now (I may come back later and add on though but I hope I had helped)
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That is literally the oldest excuse in the book.
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Kensaka said:
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@Arsene
Kindly don't quote pictures or large texts, it quickly clogs up the thread.
Also, I don't know you.
Kindly don't quote pictures or large texts, it quickly clogs up the thread.
Also, I don't know you.
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Only, you didn't. He kudosed himself.
So you're basically admitting that you're a sock.
So you're basically admitting that you're a sock.
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